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1Human rights claims vs. the state: is sovereignty really eroding? 
Chandra Lekha Sriram
“Courts throughout the world can be a forum in which people can assert the primacy of 
their human rights in all situations in which states are impeding the realization of those 
rights.” –Anthony D’Amato1
Introduction  
Human rights theorists and advocates have often suggested that the increased role 
and standing of the individual in international law, and the possibility within some human 
rights regimes that the individual can bring suit against her own state for its internal actions, 
is systematically undermining sovereignty, or that sovereignty itself has had to be re-
conceptualized as a result of the discourse of human rights.2 In particular, the relatively 
novel use of civil and criminal accountability in domestic courts for international crimes can 
be seen to challenge not only the primacy of the state, but the basic principle of non-
interference in internal affairs that is often considered central to the functioning of 
international society. I will seek in this essay to assess this general claim, which is often made 
with relatively little empirical support, through the examination of such civil and criminal 
cases.  I find that while significant inroads in the traditional preserve of sovereignty have 
indeed been made by human rights litigation, there is also significant backlash and 
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2countervailing trends that suggest that these inroads ought not be overstated. 
This article examines human rights claims as a challenge to state primacy in 
international affairs in the context of claims made through criminal accountability via the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction, and civil accountability through the use of the Alien Tort 
Claims Act (ATCA) in the US.  I examine how prosecutions for serious human rights 
violations using universal jurisdiction challenge the state in two senses: they constitute a 
direct challenge to state actors and state policy, and, while they take place in state courts, can 
be filed by individuals.  These two developments undermine the two primary protections 
that states (and their agents) have so often been able to invoke: the inviolability of state 
agents and the virtual unchallengeability of internal state behavior, and the rule that only 
states might have standing in international law.  While the development of human rights and 
international humanitarian law since the end of the Second World War have driven these 
two changes, I will not examine that historical trajectory in detail, as that has been 
thoroughly addressed by many authors elsewhere.  Rather, I will focus primarily on the way 
in which the use of universal jurisdiction exemplifies and perhaps expands this trend.  
Similarly, the protection of immunity has been increasingly limited as against civil cases as 
well, and I discuss this in the context of cases under the Alien Tort Claims Act in the US and 
civil cases for torture in the UK. However, I note that this trend is not without critics, and 
not irreversible.  I thus examine the challenges that have been raised against universal 
jurisdiction, and some countervailing trends in international law that seek to firmly situate 
the state as the primary actor. These are the recent International Law Commission Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility and the challenges to autonomous international criminal 
courts, with the concomitant emphasis on local justice. 
 
3Human rights as a challenge to the primacy of the state 
The rise of human rights discourse and instruments has arguably significantly challenged 
state sovereignty in the sense that the black box of sovereignty or the state can be opened 
up: states can be called to task for activities that are purely internal, at least in some 
instances.  A more radical argument has run that human rights do more than challenge 
sovereignty--they re-define it--sovereignty is defined not as state or popular sovereignty, but 
rather state compliance with human rights norms establishes state legitimacy or lack of it.3
This line of argumentation challenges the pure statist logic common to the disciplines of 
international relations and international law, which would have it that human rights are 
either agreed to by cynical states with no intention of upholding them, or actually constitute 
a somewhat dangerous challenge to the bases of international order.4 Instead, it is suggested, 
constraints of state jurisdiction do matter, but so too do other conceptions, such as naturalist 
conceptions of rights as inhering in individuals, transnational conceptions of society, etc. 
These theoretical foundations may be buttressed by empirical claims about effective 
implementation of human rights.  Such empirical claims are not always fully elaborated, 
although they are becoming more common; this essay seeks to contribute to these.5
Conception of state and state actor inviolability 
Traditional respect for sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in internal 
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(1992), p. 46. 
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4affairs are well established in the international legal and political systems, enshrined clearly in 
the UN Charter.  While states have engaged in ever-more elaborate bilateral and multilateral 
agreements, many of these are not directly enforceable, either in domestic courts or 
international courts, although as we shall see below this trend is changing.  Thus, for 
example, while as early as 1900 the US Supreme Court declared that “international law is 
part of our law”, the Court has notoriously been loath to apply international law and 
standards absent clear implementing legislation, and particularly wary of applying customary 
international law.6 The same may be said of many other countries as well.  The prevailing 
expectation is that set forth in the UN Charter, article 2(4), preventing the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity and political independence of member states, and article 
2(7), preventing interference in essentially internal matters of states.  While these absolute 
restrictions, as discussed below, have been eroded over time by human rights norms and 
other developments, it is worth noting that even the enforcement of those norms, discussed 
below, remains limited by practices and doctrines developed to protect states and state 
actors, in part to ensure international comity and avoid conflicts.  This includes sovereign 
and diplomatic immunity and act of state and similar doctrines. It is important, then, to 
understand the primary barriers to legal actions against states or their officials in 
international law, which may often be raised as bars to human rights cases. 
 
Challenging states: some limits in practice 
 This section will examine several limits to the possibility of challenging internal state 
action, whether in the courtrooms of another state or in international tribunals: sovereign 
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5and diplomatic immunity, the act of state doctrine, and the general absence of standing for 
individuals before international bodies. 
 Sovereign and diplomatic immunity 
Under international law, states have certain immunities from legal action, specifically 
from the exercise of jurisdiction.  These immunities may hold in civil or criminal cases, 
although as we shall see there are some differences.  While traditionally these immunities are 
understood to be quite broad,7 national legislation may seek to restrict or regulate these 
immunities; the US has sought to do so through the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA) of 1976, and the UK has done so through the State Immunity Act of 1978.8 Other 
states have subsequently enacted analogous legislation, but it is the practice of the US and 
the UK that will be addressed in this paper on this issue.9 This legislation tends to represent 
a move away from an absolute conception of immunity to a more pragmatic balancing act, 
considering the ramifications of a failure to allow the exercise of jurisdiction.  This approach 
is known as the restrictive approach to immunity.10 It is worth noting, however, that in 
recent litigation, the European Court of Human Rights declined to override state immunity 
in a case alleging human rights violations.11 
Law Debate,” American Journal of International Law vol. 98, no. 1 (January 2004), pp. 91-108. 
7 For an early US Supreme Court case representing absolute immunity, see The Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon 11 US (7 Cranch) 116, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812). 
8 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 90 Stat. 2891, 28 USCA 1330, 1332, 1391,1441, 1602-11, as 
amended by Pub.L. 100-640, 102 Stat. 3333 (1988); State Immunity Act 26 & 27 Eliz. 2, Ch. 33, 
17 I.L.M. 1123. 
9 Canada, Pakistan, Australia, Singapore, and South Africa are examples of states with similar 
legislation: see Louis Henkin, Richard Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter, and Hans Smit, 
International Law: Cases and Materials 3d ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Group, 1993), p. 
1127. 
10 Henkin, et. al., International Law p. 1127. 
11 In so doing, it rejected the emerging “normative hierarchy theory”, which suggests that 
because the norm against torture is a jus cogens norm and state immunity is not jus cogens, the 
torture claim ranks higher, hierarchically. Lee M. Caplan, “State Immunity, Human Rights, 
and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory,” American Journal of 
6In the US, the primary exception to sovereign immunity under the FSIA has been 
the so-called commercial exception, whereby foreign states are not immune from suit in 
relation to their commercial activities; precisely what constitutes a commercial activity has 
been extensively litigated.12 The FSIA itself thus constituted an exception to absolute 
immunity, but for commercial torts, not for non-commercial ones, such as torture or other 
bodily harm as we shall see below.13 
To that end, certain federal courts in the US began to interpret the Alien Tort Claims 
Act to serve as a basis for jurisdiction for civil claims against agents of foreign states acting 
in an official capacity. The Alien Tort Claims Act was passed by the First Congress of the 
US in 1789, and establishes federal district court jurisdiction over “all causes where an alien 
sues for a tort only [committed] in violation of the law of nations.”14 In the absence of 
legislative history, commentators are uncertain what the original purpose of this provision 
was, but some analyses suggest it was meant to address piracy, slave-trading, and attacks on 
foreign diplomats.15 The act thus enables claims to be brought civilly for certain acts; victims 
may seek reparation, but criminal charges cannot be brought.16 
International Law vol. 97, no. 4 (October 2003, pp. 741-81. 
12 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc 504 US 607, 112 S.Ct. 2160, 119 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992), 
US LEXIS 3542. 
13 Siderman v. The Republic of Argentina, et al. 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir., 1992). 
14 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.20, sec. 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789), codified at 28 U.S.C. 1350. 
15 See generally Ralph Steinhardt and Anthony D’Amato, eds.,  (London: Transnational 
Publishers, 1999); Kenneth C. Randall, “Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: 
Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute,” New York Univeristy Journal of International Law and 
Policy, vol. 18 (1985), p. 1; Paul Hoffman, “Civil litigation of corporate behavior in conflict 
zones: the US Alien Tort Claims Act,”  in Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, eds., 
Peaceful Profits: Approaches to Managing the Resource Dimensions of Armed Conflict (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, forthcoming 2004); Anne-Marie Burley, “The Alien Tort Claims 
Statute and Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor,” American Journal of International Law,
vol. 83 (1989), p. 461; Terry Collingsworth, “The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing 
Enforcement Mechanisms,” Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 15 (Spring 2002), p. 183. 
16 The ATCA is not the only tool to impose civil liability for international crimes: see 
generally John F. Murphy, “Civil Liability for the Commission of International Crimes as an 
7The Act was invoked very infrequently for nearly 200 years, until 1980, when a 
federal court issued an historic decision in Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, a case brought against a 
police inspector general arising out of the torture and murder of Joelito Filartiga.17 In 
Filartiga, the Court of Appeals considered and rejected the defense that the law of  nations 
could not, for the purposes of the statute, include human rights complaints; it found instead 
that such law would include existing law at the time of the events rather than of the 
enactment of the statute.  The court further found that the ban on torture had become part 
of customary international law.  Subsequent jurisprudence has established extrajudicial 
execution, disappearances, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and genocide as acts 
contrary to the law of nations for the purposes of interpreting the statute.18 
The Filartiga line of cases allowed individuals to bring suit in US courts against 
foreign officials. However, it remained unclear whether the ATCA and these cases would 
allow for jurisdiction over foreign states for tortious acts under the law of nations. In 
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp, the US Supreme Court had occasion to 
consider this issue.19 The court there determined that the FSIA was the sole legal basis to 
obtain jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court, and that, therefore, unless the case 
against the state could be made under an FSIA exception, the case, currently framed as 
deriving jurisdiction from the ATCA, could not proceed. 
Similar issues have arisen in the UK with regard to state and state official immunity 
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8against civil torts claims. The UK does not have a statute analogous to the ATCA, but has 
had occasion to hear civil cases against foreign state officials in respect of torture cases, in 
circumstances similar than those that give rise to many ATCA cases. In October 2004, the 
Supreme Court of Judicature issued a decision regarding immunity in two civil cases 
involving alleged torture by foreign states and officials.  In both cases, Jones v. The Ministry of 
the Interior  and Mitchell v. Al-Dali, British and/or Canadian citizens alleged torture at the 
hands of Saudi officials, and instituted civil cases for damages arising from the alleged 
torture, including “aggravated and exemplary damages for assault and battery, trespass to the 
person, torture and unlawful imprisonment.”20 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia sought to challenge the claims on the grounds of 
immunity under the State Immunity Act 1978 of the UK.21 The courts in earlier proceedings 
had upheld the immunity of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia itself, findings which the court in 
Jones confirmed.  The court carefully considered claims that there had occurred some 
relaxation of standards of official immunity, focusing particularly upon the distinction 
between official acts and acts which could not be viewed as in pursuit of official functions, 
and the distinction between official and private acts, before turning to the crime of torture, 
which is by definition an act that occurs in an ‘official’ capacity.22 A review of relevant 
precedent including the Pinochet  cases led the court to the conclusion that official immunity 
rationae materiae could not preclude prosecution for systematic torture. However, because the 
cases at hand involved civil liability, the extent of civil immunity had also to be considered.  
 
20 Jones v. The Ministry of the Interior Al-Mamlaka Al Arabiya as Saudia (The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia) & Anor.  Case Numbers A2 2003/2155 & A2 2004/0489 (Supreme Court of 
Judicature, United Kingdom) (28 October 2004), available at 
http://www.redress.org/news/Jones%20v%20Saudi%20Arabia.pdf,
para 1. 
21 Jones v. the Ministry of the Interior para 5. 
22 Jones v. the Ministry of the Interior paras 44-53. 
9Examining dicta in relevant criminal cases, as well as Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, and other US 
practice, the court concluded that while the Saudi government might be immune from civil 
suits, the officials themselves could not be. The court concluded, after considering issues 
such as forum non conveniens, that while such a conclusion did not empower English courts to 
act in all such cases, upon engaging in a balancing act considering all relevant issues, an 
English court could do so.23 
While the Filartiga and Jones lines of cases meant that former state officials could face 
civil charges for acts committed in the official line of duty, it is important to recognize that 
these cases did not allow for suits against currently serving heads of state or diplomatic 
representatives.  The FSIA does not deal directly with this issue, although as we shall see 
below the ICJ case DRC v. Belgium did address the issue.  However, customary international 
law as well as a web of bilateral and multilateral conventions do address diplomatic, consular, 
and state official immunity.24 The fundamental reason for these protections are relatively 
obvious—they are meant to ensure that states are not hampered in their foreign relations, 
and to ensure stability in diplomatic and therefore international relations.  The concern to 
protect diplomats and foreign officials, then, is driven by a concern that the arrest or seizure 
of their assets would lead to diplomatic conflict; therefore only a state might judge the acts 
of its own officials.25 As we shall see, similar immunities protect foreign officials against 
 
23 Jones v. the Ministry of the Interior paras 92-99. 
24 See, inter alia Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 23 UST 3227, TIAS 7502, 500 
UNTS 95 signed 18 April 1961, entry into force 24 April 1964 (for the US 13 December 1972).  
American Diplomatic Relations Act 22 USCA 254a-e available at 
http://assembler.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode22/usc_sec_22_00000254---a000-
.html; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 596 UNTS 261, 21 UST 77, TIAS no. 6820; 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations  1 UNTS 15, 21 UST 1418, TIAS 
No. 6900 (13 February 1946); see also the American International Organizations Immunities Act 
22 USCA 288a-e. 
25 Letter of 16 March 1906 from US Secretary of State Elihu Root to the US Secretary of 
Commerce and Labor, excerpted in Henkin, et al International Law pp. 1200-1201. 
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criminal suits, for so long as they are in office. 
 
Act of state doctrine 
In the United States, a further limitation to actions against foreign states exists: the 
Act of State doctrine.  This is a judge-made doctrine, developed by the US Supreme Court, 
that limits the effect of international law in US courts in cases brought against foreign states.  
This doctrine was developed to ensure a respect for foreign states, but has been used to 
prevent the exercise of jurisdiction in cases against states even where those states’ actions 
clearly constitute violations of international law. The rationale for this doctrine is similar to 
that of foreign sovereign immunity—a desire to avoid judicial interference in the foreign 
affairs of the nation. This, as the court recognized in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, was 
not required by international law but arose out of US federalism and concern to avoid 
excessive interference in one branch of government by another. 26 However, while the 
doctrine is particular to, and arises from, the US Constitution, the underlying principle is not 
unknown elsewhere. 
 
Restriction of legal standing before international courts to states 
 Traditionally, it has been understood that not only is it only states that can create 
international law, but also that only states have standing before international courts. This 
arises from a more general understanding of international law as applicable between states, 
or between states and their own citizens; if there is no recourse domestically for the latter 
relationship, there is also no recourse internationally.  This remains in large part the case 
even today.  Only states have standing before the International Court of Justice, for example, 
 
26 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino 376 US 398, 84 SCt 923, 11 L.Ed. 2d 804 (1964). 
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although organs of the United Nations such as the General Assembly do have the authority 
to request advisory opinions of the court.  While individuals may be the subjects of 
international law, attracting individual criminal responsibility for acts such as war crimes and 
genocide, there are few fora where individuals may bring suit themselves.  However, this 
does not mean that there are no fora in which individuals have standing. 
Challenges to state authority 
Universal jurisdiction and civil actions as a challenge 
 Universal jurisdiction and civil cases such as those under ATCA are challenges to  
state action and actors, casting light and judgment upon state policies and simultaneously 
establishing that certain acts cannot be shielded by doctrines such as those of immunity or 
act of state.  
 Cases whereby states exercise universal jurisdiction constitute more significant 
challenges to state sovereignty, whereby one state, usually prompted by actions by activists 
or by victims themselves, challenges the internal actions of another state. 
“Under the principle of universal jurisdiction a state is entitled or even required to 
bring proceedings in respect of certain serious crimes, irrespective of the location of the 
crime, and irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim.”27 It can be applied 
only  a very limited number of crimes.  These include war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
genocide, and torture; it is sometimes said to include slavery and for historical reasons 
encompasses piracy.   The cases brought against Augusto Pinochet Ugarte in Spain and the 
 
27 International Law Association, Committee on International Human Rights Law and 
Practice, Final Report on the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights 
Offenses (2000), p. 2. On the infringement upon sovereignty, see Brad R. Roth, “Liberalism, 
Anti-Sovereigntism and Excesses in the Drive Against Impunity,” Finnish Yearbook of 
International Law vol. XII (2001).  See also Maria Luisa Bartolomei, “Universal Jurisdiction 
versus National Sovereignty—Implementing Human Rights in a Global World—Some 
examples from Latin America,” paper presented at the annual conference of the Law and 
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case filed against Ariel Sharon in Belgium are only the most famous examples of the use of 
universal jurisdiction to seek to obtain custody of a defendant for crimes committed far from 
the nation and court seeking to try him or her.28 
The exercise of universal jurisdiction may constitute a significant challenge to 
national sovereignty and may constitute a deviation from the principle, enshrined in Article 
2(7) of the UN Charter, of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. Jurisdiction has 
historically been closely tied to territorial sovereignty, with quite limited exceptions for 
extraterritorial application.29 With the exception of universal jurisdiction, extraterritorial 
application of jurisdiction has tended to require a nexus with the state seeking to hear a case.  
There are four other commonly cited bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction:  territorial, basing 
jurisdiction upon the place where the offence was committed or had its effects; national, 
based upon the nationality of the offender; protective, based upon injury to the national 
interest; and passive personal, based upon the nationality of the victim.30 
Significant or high-profile cases have included those brought against Augusto 
Pinochet Ugarte in Spain and elsewhere, those filed against Israeli President Ariel Sharon in 
 
Society Association (Budapest, 2001). 
28 For a broad survey of recent cases, see Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Contemporary practice 
of universal jurisdiction: disjointed and disparate, yet developing,” International Journal of 
Human Rights vol. 6 (Fall 2002). The Belgian case against Sharon was dropped on the 
grounds that a case could only be carried out against persons found on Belgian territory.  
“War Crimes Charges Against Sharon Dropped,” The New York Times online (26 June 2002), 
at http://www.nytimes.com; “Belgian court ruling throws doubt on Sharon trial,” Ha’aretz 
(16 April 2002), at http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/.
29 For a fuller articulation of the relationship between sovereignty and the jurisdictional 
powers to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, “The history of 
universal jurisdiction and its place in international law,” in Macedo, ed., Universal jurisdiction.
See also Ellen S. Podgor. “Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction: Replacing ‘Objective 
Territoriality’ with ‘Defensive Territoriality’,” paper presented at the annual conference of 
the Law and Society Association (Vancouver, 2002). 
30 United States v. Yunis, Pretrial Memorandum Order No. 4; see generally Thomas M. Franck 
and Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Relations and National Security Law: Cases, Materials, and 
Simulations, 2d. ed. (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, MN, 1993) 212-215.   
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Belgium, those filed and then abandoned against former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré, 
and many more.31 Of particular note is that these were high-profile challenges not simply to 
acts within states, but to official acts carried out by heads of state.  While the Sharon case 
has been dropped for the duration of his tenure as a head of state, and the issue of immunity 
was never litigated in relation to Habré, the UK courts did not recognize Pinochet’s claim to 
former head of state immunity. The Law Lords initially found that ex head of state immunity 
could not be found for acts such as torture, hostage-taking, and other grave international 
crimes.  For unrelated reasons that initial decision was overturned; the Law Lords 
subsequently held that while ex-heads of state did enjoy immunity in the U.K. with respect 
to the exercise of official functions, torture could not be viewed as an official function.32 
Thus the claim against Pinochet could have proceeded, as it was not barred by immunity; 
Pinochet was returned to Chile on other grounds. 
 
ATCA cases and civil cases in the UK have already been discussed above and will be 
addressed briefly. Increasingly, defenses of state immunity, or bars such as the Act of State 
doctrine in the US, are viewed as illegitimate defenses to charges of torture and other serious 
violations of human rights because, it is argued, such activities cannot be viewed as 
legitimate instruments of state policy.  As already discussed above in the context of the 
ATCA, former officials are not allowed to claim immunity in civil cases.  Similarly, federal 
courts in the US have found that the Act of State doctrine is not a bar to a civil suit against 
 
31 For a survey see Chandra Lekha Sriram “Exercising Universal Jurisdiction: Contemporary 
Disparate Practice,” International Journal of Human Rights vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter 2002). 
32 Judgment: In Re Pinochet (Oral judgment: 17 December 1998; Reasons: 15 January 1999), 
available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office/; Judgment--Regina v. Bartle and the 
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and others Ex Parte Pinochet; Regina v. Evans and Another and 
the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis Ex Parte Pinochet (24 March 1999), available at 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office/, reprinted in 38 ILM 581 (1999).   
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officials for torture. It is worth noting, however, that in the relevant cases the acts of torture 
were not clearly authorized by the foreign state’s law itself; were they authorized or 
specifically required by the foreign state itself it remains unclear whether an act against the 
state could proceed under the act of state doctrine.33 
Standing of individuals in international law 
 While the traditional conception of international law presumes that only states can 
be subjects, and thus only states have rights and obligations, and the possibility of enforcing 
these or being subject to enforcement action, the rise of human rights discourse and 
agreement has meant that this is increasingly not the case.  Individuals have standing to 
make claims against states for violations of rights in a variety of fora , indirectly and, 
increasingly, directly.  For example, while individuals cannot petition the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights directly, they can file a complaint before the Inter-American 
Commission, which can forward this complaint to the Court for action.  Individuals can 
petition the European Court of Human Rights directly, and individual petitions to the court 
now number in the thousands, far exceeding the inter-state complaints before that body.34 
Individuals also have standing before the European Court of Justice, and optional protocols 
to the ICCPR and CEDAW permit individuals and groups to submit petitions.  The Torture 
Convention and the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination also have optional individual complaint procedures.  Finally, as already 
discussed, individuals can bring civil cases under ATCA in the US or under universal 
jurisdiction in several countries. In some states such as Belgium individuals can not only 
 
33 Forti v. Suarez-Mason 672 F.Supp 1531 (N.D.Cal. 1987). Filartiga also found that 
unauthorized torture by a foreign official could not be properly treated as an act of state. . 
34 European Court of Human Rights, “Case Law Information Notes,” at 
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bring complaints for prosecutors to carry out, but can act as parties civiles  to bring cases on 
their own behalf.35 
Countervailing trends 
While the trends detailed above may lead to the implication that state sovereignty is 
progressively being eroded by human rights claims in national courts, whether civil or 
criminal, and by implication perhaps that international courts may also erode sovereignty, 
these claims ought not be overstated.  I note in particular three developments that might 
suggest a backlash by states: the US challenges to the International Criminal Court, the 
challenges at the ICJ by the Democratic Republic of Congo to cases against its officials 
through the exercise of universal jurisdiction in Belgium and France, and the latest draft 
articles on state responsibility by the International Law Commission. 
 The US v. the ICC 
 The American objections to the International Criminal Court have been public and 
vehement, and are viewed by many as but another instance of American exceptionalism.  
This may well be, but it is also important to note that US objections are also couched in 
more familiar language of state sovereignty, and claim that domestic rather than foreign or 
international courts ought to have jurisdiction over a state’s citizens. As is well known the 
US has used a number of tools to protect its citizens, and in particular its troops in 
peacekeeping operations, from possible jurisdiction of the ICC.  In addition to “unsigning” 
the treaty the US has used so-called “Article 98” agreements and renewal of peacekeeping 
mandates to attempt to eliminate possible avenues of court jurisdiction.  It has done so 
 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/InfoNotesAndSurveys.htm.  
35 Luc Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 108. 
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because, while jurisdiction is consent-based and the US clearly has not consented, the court 
has jurisdiction over any cases arising on the territory of a state party, even if committed by a 
non-state party.36 Article 98 agreements refer to that article of the ICC Statute, which seeks 
to ensure that provisions for jurisdiction do not undermine previous bilateral agreements 
regarding jurisdiction of foreign nationals, usually included in agreements regarding military 
bases.  The US has sought, in deviation from the original purpose of this article, to create 
new bilateral agreements with states parties to the ICC Statute to ensure that those states will 
not surrender US citizens to the Court. The US has also vetoed the renewal of peacekeeping 
mission mandates in order to compel the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1422, 
deferring investigation of cases involving personnel in UN-authorized operations.37 
The DRC v. universal jurisdiction 
In April 2000, a Belgian magistrate issued an international arrest warrant, seeking the 
detention for extradition of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Yerodia Ndombasi for alleged crimes constituting “serious violations of 
international law”. The DRC filed a case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
contesting Belgium’s jurisdiction and seeking provisional measures to discharge the warrant 
immediately.  The DRC contended that as there was no evidence of jurisdiction based on 
territory, in personam jurisdiction, or harm to the security or dignity of Belgium, grounds for 
arrest were lacking and the actions of Belgium violated, inter alia, the principle of sovereign 
legal equality.  The DRC contended that a variety of multilateral conventions addressing 
specific international offenses created universal jurisdiction, but only where the alleged 
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perpetrator was on the territory of the state seeking jurisdiction; it also asserted diplomatic 
immunity for the accused.  Belgium requested that the case be removed from the ICJ’s list; 
in December the court rejected that request but also refused to take the provisional measure 
of discharging the warrant requested by the DRC. 
 In February of 2002, the court issued its decision in the case.38 Most importantly, it 
did not explicitly reject the exercise of universal jurisdiction by Belgium;39 rather it found 
that the exercise in this instance was in violation of legal obligations of Belgium towards the 
DRC, as it failed to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction enjoyed by an 
incumbent minister under international law.  The court did not accept claims that the acts 
for which the arrest warrant was issued could not be legal acts within the performance of 
official duties, but rather indicated that the warrant would have undermined the conduct of 
foreign relations by the minister.  The court, thus, issued an order that Belgium cancel the 
international arrest warrant.  The ramifications of this case will become clearer over time; 
certainly it means that the case prepared in Belgium against Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of 
Israel cannot go forward while he is in office.  The limitation of the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction by diplomatic immunity has now been clearly articulated, but gray areas remain; 
in particular immunities attaching to former diplomats or heads of state for acts undertaken 
in office. 
 France initiated proceedings for torture and crimes against humanity in the DRC’s 
(formerly Zaire) neighbor, the Republic of the Congo, under articles 689-1 and 689-2 of the 
French Code of Criminal Procedure.40The Republic of the Congo challenged attempts to 
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undertake investigations against, inter alia, the sitting President, Denis Sassou Nguesso, and 
sought provisional measures to compel France to suspend these judicial proceedings. The 
case poses a more direct challenge to universal jurisdiction than the DRC v. Belgium  
proceedings in which the DRC challenged the legality of the arrest warrant but dropped the 
objections regarding the legality of the arrest warrant as a part of the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction.  In its case against France, the Republic of the Congo has argued that a sitting 
head of state, or cabinet minister such as the Minister of the Interior (also a subject of 
investigations in France), is immune from any ‘act of authority’ by another state that would 
hinder them in the exercise of their duties, and further that the ‘unilateral’ exercise by a state 
of universal jurisdiction is a violation of the sovereign equality enshrined in article 2(1) of the 
UN Charter. 
 On 17 June 2003, the ICJ rejected the request  by the Republic of the Congo for an 
order for a provisional measure.  The court rejected claims by the Congo that immediate 
measures were necessary in order to prevent irreparable prejudice to the accused or the 
Congo, or damage to French-Congolese relations, largely on the grounds that Congo had 
failed to provide concrete evidence of such harm.41 The court reasoned that since French 
law recognizes the immunities of heads of state, there could be no urgent concern that a case 
would go forward against the sitting president, and that the other individuals being 
investigated had yet to be the subject of any proceedings.  The order at this provisional 
measures stage did not address the direct challenge to universal jurisdiction raised by the 
application of the Republic of the Congo. 
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 ILC draft articles 
Since its initial report in 1956, the International Law Commission has been engaged 
in codification of the principles of state responsibility, which enumerate types of harms by 
and against states that are wrongful, and actions that may be taken in response.  While at one 
time it was contemplated that such acts might be denoted not merely as harms or as 
wrongful, but as crimes, the most recent articles by the ILC do not so denote them.42 What 
is noteworthy about the articles for the purposes of this essay is that, contra  the trends 
towards individual standing discussed above, the articles remain firmly state-focused.43 Only 
states can invoke the responsibility of another state for violations of obligations, under the 
articles.  This is the case even though the articles refer to those obligations as obligations to 
the international community as a whole, rather than, as noted by one eminent scholar, the 
international community of states as a whole.44 This approach, focusing upon harms to states, 
thus deviates from an earlier set of draft articles, completed in the 1960s, that emphasized 
injury to alien persons and property; individuals would not then have gained standing but 
would have been the subject of harms generating claims by states.45 What this implies is 
some recognition of actors other than states as possessors of rights that may be harmed, 
even though only states may then complain.  It is worth noting, however, that states that are 
not harmed may complain of violations.  Any such harms or violations would be cause for 
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civil rather than criminal action; states can lodge claims for reparations.46 States can also 
initiate non-forceful countermeasures; the ILC discussions centered around specific features 
of application, in particular proportionality.47 At the moment the Articles exclude the 
possibility of individual action, and it seems unlikely that this will change in the near future. 
As one commentator noted,  
“The exclusion of individuals and international organizations from the scope of the articles 
was a relatively uncontroversial move, but it could be criticized for a lack of vision.  Does it 
really make sense to hermetically seal state responsibility from that of other international 
actors, particularly at a time when nonstate actors are gaining in strength, power, prestige, 
and legitimacy? Ultimately all this may well matter the most at the intersection of state 
power, individual rights, and countermeasures.”48 
Backlash and demands for local justice 
It is not only the United States, with its campaign against the ICC, or the DRC, with its 
challenges to universal jurisdiction at the ICJ, that have raised challenges to the use of 
specific tools such as universal jurisdiction and, more generally, international tribunals, to 
pursue cases challenging state violation of international human rights or humanitarian law 
abroad.  The statute of the ICC rightly recognizes the principle of complementarity, just as 
the European Court of Human Rights preserves the principle of subsidiarity.49 This is the 
case not merely because of state fear of intrusion into internal affairs, or judgment of their 
own abuses, but because such power could be wielded for political purposes rather than 
 
Journal of International Law vol. 96, no. 4 (October 2002), pp. 817-32, p. 829. 
46 Dinah Shelton, “Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility,” 
American Journal of International Law vol. 96, no. 4 (October 2002), pp. 833-56. 
47 Bederman, “Invoking State Responsibility”. 
48 Bederman, “Invoking State Responsibility”, p. 829 (citations omitted). 
49 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, preamble and article 1, at 
http://www.un.org/law/icc/; as discussed by Leila Nadya Sadat, “complementarity has a 
substantive component, a procedural component, and a component that we may think of as 
‘political’ or ‘prudential’”; the last element is of greatest concern for us here.  See Sadat, The 
International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law: Justice for the New 
Millennium (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2002), p. 119. 
21
“justice”, and thus might merit some real constraints.  This is noted by even such advocates 
of human rights and more humane governance as Richard Falk, who notes that those with 
the greatest capacity to act to protect rights are also those likely to have ulterior motives or 
other agendas.50 Such concerns may rightly arise with respect to tools of civil and criminal 
accountability.  To the degree that proceedings take place only in the courts of powerful 
Western states, and often in those of former colonizers, the argument that cases are 
selective, and even driven by imperialistic agendas, can be and has been raised.  This has 
been raised by, for example, the International Law Association, an independent association 
of international legal experts with no particular political affiliation or preference based in 
London: 
“…the decision to initiate proceedings on the basis of universal jurisdiction may be objected 
to.  States exercising universal jurisdiction on this basis may be accused of jurisdictional 
imperialism because universal jurisdiction is only likely to be exercised in powerful states 
with regard to crimes committed in less powerful states.”51 
Such concerns may naturally be overstated, but are worth noting in that they comprise a 
supplement to more obviously cynical objections to legal action challenging internal actions 
by sovereign states. One reader has suggested, for example, that the tools described in this 
paper might be turned to the “war on terror” with troubling consequences.52 
One outcome of suggestions that international justice is, alternately, too invasive, 
potentially imperialistic, or simply fails to have specific desired effects has been the 
development of alternate, hybrid forms of justice.  I will not discuss these in detail here as I 
have done elsewhere; suffice to say that hybrid forms of justice, such as the mixed tribunals 
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in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere, involve the use of local and international law, 
and local and international justice, in venues based in countries affected by human rights 
violations and mass atrocities.  They also, by design, include the participation of states that 
may themselves have been involved in atrocities, but may be seen as distinct from traditional 
transitional justice, which might involve little or no international interference.53 
Trying Saddam: the Special Case of the Iraqi Special Tribunal 
The Special Tribunal established to try Saddam Hussein can be viewed as an attempt 
to pursue justice domestically, and in a state-oriented tribunal rather than accept any real 
international interference or participation by individuals. Iraq is not, of course, a “typical” 
transitional state with a negotiated transition; the transitional regime is a new one installed by 
force, and thus decisions about accountability could be taken by the state alone. There is no 
reason, a priori, why Hussein and his fellow Ba’athists could not be tried before an ad hoc 
tribunal like those created for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or a mixed tribunal such 
as those created or in creation in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, and Cambodia. 54 
However, such devices were rejected in favor of a domestic tribunal.  This does not in itself 
make the tribunal illegitimate—far from it—but may generate concerns about the conduct 
of trials. Rather it is important to note that the Tribunal, constituted as it is of Iraqis and 
with US support, but little general international participation, was not the only possible 
model: alternatives such as an ad hoc or mixed tribunal have already been mentioned.  Cases 
might also have been brought through the tools discussed in this chapter, allowing 
individuals to bring civil or criminal claims in the courts of other states, or cases through 
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Iraqi courts. It is perhaps notable then that this is a state-controlled exercise in two senses—
the absence of individual claimants and the relative absence of international participation. It 
is certainly the case that, should the trials meet international standards, domestic courts 
elsewhere would, following the principle of ne bis in idem, be unable to pursue criminal cases, 
and might well decline to examine civil cases, although these would not necessarily be 
prohibited.  
The Iraqi Governing Council adopted the a statute for an Iraqi Special Tribunal in 
December of 2003; the Tribunal was authorized to prosecute genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes perpetrated during the period 1968-2003.  In April 2004, the Iraqi 
Governing Council announced the creation of the tribunal to try Hussein and others from 
his regime.55 The tribunal came under swift attack by human rights organizations for its 
composition and its potential use of the death penalty.  The latter is beyond the scope of this 
inquiry, but the appointment of the nephew of the head of the Iraqi National Congress 
political party raised immediate concerns by advocates that the trials might be politically 
driven, even constitute a ‘kangaroo court’ or victors’ justice.56 Further, while some 
international actors will be engaged, including on Hussein’s defense staff, the composition of 
the tribunal’s prosecutors and judges is entirely Iraqi, although the Statute had permitted the 
use of some non-Iraqi judges. Further, the investigative support that has been offered 
internationally was provided by the United States, by a team of some 50 investigators from 
various agencies of the US Department of Justice, which may further to contribute to 
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concerns about bias.57 At the reading of the charges against him in mid-2004, Hussein 
certainly emphasized his claim that the court was illegitimate: while his claims are clearly 
driven by interest there may be cause for concern.58 
It would be unrealistic to expect that the previously corrupt, and largely destroyed, 
Iraqi justice system, could handle cases of such magnitude on its own.  The knowledge of, 
much less practice in, international human rights or humanitarian law by domestic judges 
and lawyers was said to be non-existent.59 The Tribunal proposes to address these limits in 
part by drawing upon the Iraqi exile community, some of whom are qualified jurists. 
However, critics contend that simply bringing back Iraqi exiles will not solve the problem, 
but rather bring in competing political agendas. Concerns about the court are compounded 
by the absence of some key protections of international human rights law, including that the 
judges and prosecutors working on cases have expertise in human rights or complex criminal 
cases.60 An advisory meeting for the Iraqi judges and prosecutors on the tribunal confirmed 
these fears: even the Iraqi participants themselves acknowledged their lack of expertise.  
Further, the UN barred its own experts from participation in the meeting on the grounds 
that it did not meet international standards.61 Certainly, whether the trials are fairly 
conducted or not, the Special tribunal stands as a clear instance in which a state sought not 
to allow other actors, be they courts of other states or an international court, to examine 
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internal atrocities, much less to allow individual claims against Hussein. 
Conclusions  
I began this essay with the suggestion that the increased role of the individual in 
international law, particularly through human rights claims, had begun to erode state 
sovereignty.  This is a common enough assertion in international relations and international 
legal literature, but is seldom examined in any specific detail. I sought, therefore, to examine 
the claim more closely, identifying the traditional place of the state in international law and 
the legal protections erected around that state, such as sovereign immunity.  I looked as well 
as the traditional exclusion of individuals, who have generally not been granted standing in 
international law.  I then examined two specific legal tools, one civil and one criminal, that 
not only empower the individual to bring claims for violations of international law, but to 
bring claims against other states.  These tools have allowed individuals to make significant 
inroads in state sovereignty, but even these have been limited by claims of immunity.  It is 
worth noting that there has also been a backlash of sorts, against aspects of expansion of 
international justice, by the US against the ICC, by the DRC against cases based upon 
universal jurisdiction in Belgium, etc.  While not constituting backlash per se, the ILC’s 2001 
draft articles on state responsibility clearly exclude individuals from claims, despite steps in 
an early draft to include them.  Similarly, the trial of Saddam Hussein appears to be one in 
which significant international involvement might have been expected but over which the 
state has sought to maintain firm control. 
